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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and 
sentence of the Court below for a third degree felony crime, 
possession of one ounce of marijuana. Jurisdiction of this 
Court is therefore conferred by Rule 26, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and Section 78-2a-3 (2) (e), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE 
POINT II: THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR 
FELONY POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IS AN 
UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFINITION OF A CRIME 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
2. Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution 
3. Section 58-3f-8(5)(a&b) 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs , 
LANE C. STOMBERG, 
Appellant, Case No. 880618 CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged by way of Information with two 
drug offenses and two offenses involving tax stamps. After a jury 
trial, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled sub-
stance, to-wit: marijuana, a third degree felony. 
Chief Gardner of the Syracuse Police Department met with 
a fifteen year old female in connection with an investigation in 
the beginning of April, 1988. At that first meeting, there was 
no mention made of any drugs. ( See reporter's transcript of 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, page 10, 12 and 14, 
hereinafter referred to as Tr. Ms.) The fifteen year old in-
formant, Tessie Heber, indicated to Chief Gardner in a sub-
sequent interview that she had seen marijuana pipes in the home 
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of the defendant (Tr. Ms. p. 18) and that she had seen the 
defendant smoke marijuana three to four times, but that she 
had never seen him smoking marijuana in the house. (Tr. Ms. p. 
20) The testimony was that she had seen the pipes in three 
locations one and one half years previous to the interview. 
( Tr. Ms. p. 27) The last time that she had been in the 
house, was the first week in March, 1988. Further, she told 
the officer that she had never seen drugs in the house. (Tr. 
Ms. p. 25) 
Chief Gardner put all of the information provided by 
Ms. Heber into the affidavit for the search warrant. ( Tr. Ms. 
p. 52) Chief Gardner did not check the credibility of Ms. 
Heber although he was aware that she was seeing a 
psychiatrists for stress as well group therapy at school. 
( Tr. Ms. p. 54-5) Further, Ms. Heber had never experienced 
marijuana, (Tr. Ms. p. 22) nor her ability to identify 
marijuana pipes as opposed to other pipes. 
Both Chief Gardner and Lon Brian, Davis County 
Sheriff, Metro -Narc Task Force, felt that the information 
from Ms. Heber was not sufficient to justify a search 
warrant.( Tr. Ms. p. 30 and 89) Further, the statements 
attributed to Brian in paragraphs five and six of the 
affidavit, ( Record p. 7) were made months prior to the 
signing of the affidavit and issuance of the warrant. 
(Tr. Ms. p. 122) 
Further surveillance conducted on the defendant's 
home ( see e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 34) just prior to the issuance of 
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the warrant, cars belonging to certain known drug distributors 
were seen parked near the defendant's home, although this 
information as not presented to the magistrate. ( Tr. Ms. p 
45.) The timing and purpose for the search was a concern for 
new drugs, ( Tr. Ms. p.46.) and to search for other drugs 
while in the house, not just marijuana pipes. ( Tr. Ms. p 48-
9.) 
At the motion to suppress, Mr. Mark Andrus, Davis 
County Attorney's Office, testified with regard to the 
preparation and purpose of the search warrant and search. In 
connection with the preparation of the affidavit that they 
intentionally took an expansive reading of the statements by 
Ms. Heber to authorize a broader search. As noted, controlled 
substance was used, rather than just "marijuana", which was 
what was told to the authorities by Ms. Heber. ( see e.g. Tr. 
Ms. p. 77) The purpose of the search warrant was to be able 
to search for any controlled substances and any paraphernalia, 
not just marijuana nor marijuana pipes, (see e.g. Record p. 
85) Further, the drugs that were being sought were not the 
same drugs that had previously been there, but it was hoped 
that new drugs would be available and ,on the premises, (see 
e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 189.) Further, Mr. Andrus knew that they did 
not have information that the defendant was drug dealer, but 
they hoped to be able to develop some information later and 
get a second search warrant, which they attempted to do. (see 
e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 187-8.) It was therefore the basis and the 
thrust of Mr. Andrus' testimony that although all that they 
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had were evidence of marijuana pipes being on the premises, 
that they wished an expansive search warrant to allow to 
search for all sorts of drugs and paraphernalia and other 
items in the belief that new drugs would be present to develop 
a case against the defendant. ( See Mr. Andrus1 testimony p.17 
Tr. Ms. p. 176-192.) Further, it was Mr. Andrus1 hope that if 
nothing else, the search and drugs would be leverage in a 
separate sex case, if they were to find any. ( Tr. Ms. p. 
184.) 
Further, the search warrant attempted to authorize a 
search for "identification cards, records, accounts, etc.," 
although everyone knew that there was no evidence to justify 
or base any reason for that search, other than to explore for 
potential evidence. ( Tr. Ms. p. 60-61.) 
Based upon the affidavit presented, a search warrant 
was issued and a search was conducted of the defendant's home 
on May 20, 1988. The house was completely searched, as well 
as separate garage, where other controlled substances were 
allegedly found ( e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 127.) Further, the searched 
lasted for approximately ten hours. 
After an extensive hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress held September 2, 1988, the District Court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress. ( see Record p. 9) At the 
time of trial the evidence gathered from the search was 
admitted into evidence, and defendant was convicted of third 
degree felony, possession of a controlled substance, to-wit, 
marijuana, in that the jury found that the defendant did 
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possess just over one ounce of marijuana within one thousand 
feet of a public school. However, there was no evidence that 
there was anything other than possession in the defendant's 
home, which abutted a school. (Transcript herein in re 
certificate of probable cause p.4) It was on that basis, that 
there was merely simple possession near a school, as opposed 
to involving use in proximity of a school, which was the basis 
for issuing a certificate of probable case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant on 
its face fails to demonstrate that there was probable cause 
that a crime had been committed and that there would be 
evidence of that crime in the defendant's residence. In 
addition, what evidence was in the affidavit was stale and of 
no further efficacy. In addition, the search warrant in issue 
was over broad and pretextural in connection with seeking of 
evidence of other crimes than that contained of in the 
affidavit. 
POINT II: THAT A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR 
FELONY POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IS AN 
UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFINITION OF A CRIME 
That defendant was convicted of possession of just 
over one ounce of marijuana, an ordinary class "A" 
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misdemeanor, however, based upon the possession occurring 
within one thousand feet of a school, the offense was a third 
degree felony. Such is unreasonable, arbitrary and a denial 
of the constitutional rights of a defendant. Further, said 
argument is further made because there was no evidence of any 
connection between the controlled substance and a school. 
ft TEGUMENT 
POINT I: THAT EVIDENCE OBTAIN PURSUANT TO THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State vs. Miller. 740 
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1987) discussed the requirements of issuing a 
search warrant. Illinois vs. Gates 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), 
the court stated, at page 1365: " 
11
 The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
practical, commonsense decision, whether, given 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of 
knowledge1 of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place. And the duty of a 
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had 
a substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that 
probable cause existed." 
The Utah Supreme Court in State vs. Hansen 732 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1987) , further elaborated on the requirements for 
the issuance of a search warrant. The court stated at page 
130, 
"Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in 
a common-sense reasonable manner. .State v. 
Williamson, 674 P.2d 132, 133 ( Utah 1983); State 
v. Pursell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978). Excessive 
technical dissection of an informant's tip or of 
the nontechnical language in the officer's 
affidavit is ill-suited to this task m i i no is v. 
Gates) 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S. Ct. at 
2328-30, 2330-31, In Gates, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that an informant's 'reliability' and 
'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant 
considerations, among others, in determining the 
existence of probable cause under 'a totality-of-
the-circumstances.* 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 
103 S. Ct. at 2328-30, 2330-31. They are not 
strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly 
exacted' in every case. A weakness in one or 
other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in 
the totality there is substantial basis to find 
probable cause. Id. at 230, 238, 103 S. Ct. at 
2328, 2332. The indicia of veracity, reliability, 
and basis of knowledge are no exclusive elements 
to be evaluated in reaching the practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability that 
the contraband will be found in the place 
described." 
Although Gates adopted the totality of the 
circumstances test, rejecting the Aauilar-Soinelli two prong 
test, the two prong test may still need to followed. As 
stated in State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984), a case 
decided after the rejection of the technical requirements of 
Aquilar-Spinelli, at page 1205: 
"However, even under this standard, compliance 
with the Aguilar-Spinel1i guidelines may be 
necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable 
cause. Depending on the circumstances, a showing 
of the basis of knowledge and veracity or 
reliability of the person providing the 
information for a warrant may well be necessary 
to establish with a fair 'probability' that the 
evidence sought actually exists and can be found 
actually exists and can be found where the 
informant states." 
In the affidavit in the case at bar, there is no 
indication that the defehdant was currently committing a 
crime, or there would be evidence of that crime at his home. 
The affidavit merely stated that the informant had seen the 
defendant smoke marijuana three or four times in an unknown 
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location and that she had see various marijuana pipes lying 
around the house. There is no where stated in there the basis 
for that information and the source of that knowledge. 
Further, although in paragraph four the affiant stated that 
the girl was reliable, he was well aware of various 
psychological and other problems of Ms. Heber, and in 
addition, reasons for her to lie.( see Tr. Ms. at 54-57) 
Further, there was no reason to believe that there was any 
present likelihood of the same marijuana or the same pipes to 
be present. The claim in paragraphs five and six that people 
who smoke marijuana generally have evidence of drugs around 
their house, would clearly not be an appropriate factual basis 
to support any search warrant. Based upon that same argument, 
a warrant would have been proper two years ago to the home of 
Court of Appeals Judge Allen Ginsberg, based upon his having 
smoked marijuana at party ten years before. There is a 
requirement that there be probable cause existing at that time 
that a particular piece of contraband or evidence is present, 
not the likelihood that it has not been disposed of over a 
long period of time. 
The related and flip side of this concern has* to do 
with staleness, and the currency of the present information, 
which is an essential to the determination of probable cause. 
As stated in the United States vs. McCall, 740 F.2d 1333 
(Fourth Circuit 1984) the Court stated at pages 1335-36: 
"The Fourth Amendment bars search warrants 
issued on less than probable cause, and 
there is no question that time is a crucial 
element of probable cause. A valid search 
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warrant may issue only upon allegations of 
'facts so closely related to the time of the 
issue of the warrant as to justify a finding 
of probable cause at that time. Whether 
proof meets this test must be determined by 
the circumstances of each case.' Consequently, 
evidence seized pursuant to a warrants afforded 
by 'stale' probable cause is not admissible 
in a criminal trial to establish the 
defendant's guilt. 
Cases in which staleness becomes an issue arise 
in two different context. First, the facts 
alleged in the warrant may have been sufficient 
to establish probable cause, when the warrant was 
issued, but the government's delay in executing 
the warrant possibly tainted the search. Second, 
the warrant itself may be suspect because the 
information upon which it rested was arguably to 
old to furnish 'present' probable cause. 
Reviewing the court's task in each category of 
cases is slightly different. In testing a warrant 
in the first category, it must decide whether a 
valid warrant became invalid due a lapse of 
time; when considering those in the second 
category, it must determine whether inform-
ation sufficient to constitute probable cause was 
ever presented. The court's fundamental 
concern, however, is always the same: Did 
the facts alleged in the warrant furnish probable 
cause to believe, at the time the search was 
actually conducted, that evidence of criminal 
activity was located at the premises search?" 
(citations omitted) 
The evidence presented in the affidavit is clearly 
stale. The most that can be said from the affidavit is that 
in a period one and one half years prior to the affidavit, 
that the defendant had been seen smoking marijuana three or 
four times. Further, the confidential informant had seen 
marijuana pipes in the defendant's house on a number of 
occasions, the exact number not known, although the last was 
at least two and one half months prior to the warrant. Thus, 
unless the Court excepts the proposition that once an 
individual has marijuana pipes in his home, that it would give 
-9-
probable cause to believe that those same marijuana pipes 
would be present at any time, the information was too stale in 
this case to support the search. 
It is also clear that the search warrant in this 
case was pretextural and the purpose was not as set forth in 
the affidavit. As testified to by Mark Andrus, Davis County 
Attorney, they were not seeking the same marijuana in the 
house as had supposedly been seen. (Tr. Ms. p. 189.) Further, 
they were seeking evidence of other drugs and other crimes 
rather than merely the marijuana or the marijuana pipes. ( Tr. 
Ms. p.175-183, Chief Gardner's testimony Tr. Ms. p. 46.) 
Further, the search warrant sought to authorize a search for " 
identification cards, records, accounts, books, pictures, 
receipts, etc.," notwithstanding the fact that there was no 
probable cause or basis to believe that would be there based 
upon the statements of the confidential informant that there 
were marijuana pipes seen at the house. Therefore, it is 
clear that the search warrant was pretextural, the intended 
purpose of the search was for something other than that 
contained in the affidavit and search warrant. Further, the 
officers and the county attorney knew that they did not have 
sufficient basis for the other matters, but used the search 
warrant to search for other items. ( see testimony of Lon 
Brian, Davis County Sheriff, Tr. Ms. at 89 and 110-112, Chief 
Gardner Tr. Ms. at p. 30, 46, 48-49, County Attorney, Andrus 
Tr. Ms. P. 175-84.) Therefore, said evidence was not properly 
seized pursuant to the search warrant, but went "beyond it. 
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Therefore, since there was no probable cause in the 
search warrant, since any evidence and information was stale 
the Court should find that the evidence was improperly seized. 
In addition, based upon the pretextural nature of the search 
the overbreadth of the warrant, the lack of probable cause for 
the particulars of it, this Court should similarly rule that 
the search warrant was improper and invalid, and disallow any 
evidenced seized pursuant to it. 
POINT II: THAT A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT 
FOR FELONY POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
IS AN UNREASONABLE AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF A 
CRIME 
Defendant was convicted of a third degree felony 
possession of marijuana because he was within the provision of 
the enhancement portion of the Controlled Substances Act, 
requiring that if possession is within one thousand feet of 
any school, it shall be third degree felony. It is submitted 
that without more, this violates the defendant's due process 
rights, especially in absence of evidence that there was any 
nexus or relationship between the possession of the marijuana 
and being within one thousand feet of a school. 
As stated in Cardar^lla vs City of Overland Park 620 
P.2d 1120 ( Kansas 1980), at page 1127: 
"A guarantee of due process demands only that 
the statute shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary 
or capricious, and that the means selected 
shall have a real and substantial relation to 
the objective sought to be obtained. Nebbia v. 
New York 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed 
940 ( 1934.) 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that arbitrary 
classification of crimes may be unconstitutional. See e.g. 
State v. Clark 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981) at 843. 
It is submitted that it is arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable to elevate a class "A" misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana to a third degree felony merely because it is in 
within one thousand feet of a school without more. If the 
statute were to require or if the evidence herein showed that 
there was some relationship between the possession and the 
school- such as a sharing with the young students of that 
school or attempted sales or anything else, there may be a 
reason. But merely based upon the fortuitous fact that the 
defendant's home was within one thousand feet of school does 
not present a rationale basis to elevate this crime to a 
felony. There is no reason to elevate the crime in the 
absence of some further nexus or connection. Physical 
location is not sufficient. 
It also raises great concerns with regard to 
unreasonable and unbridled discretion of the prosecutor to 
charge. If you have a situation where an individual possessed 
some marijuana in a car, if he travels within one thousand 
feet of a school, it could be a felony, although the 
prosecutor would not charge it as a felony. Further, it may 
be difficult are in various parts of the State of Utah to 
find places that greater than one thousand feet of school so 
that an intelligent criminal could merely be guilty of a 
misdemeanor, as opposed to a felony. However, the discretion 
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is too great, the basis for the elevation to tenuous to 
sustain or justify and it is improper to grant so much 
discretion to a prosecutor in the choice of the charge. 
See e.g. State vs. Bryant 709 P2d 257 (Utah 1985) Therefore, 
there is no rational basis for the elevation of the alleged 
misdemeanor to a felony in the particulars of this case, nor 
on the face of the statute. Thus, the classification if 
arbitrary, capricious and lacking in rational basis, and 
cannot be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence 
obtained pursuant to the search warrant in the present case 
was improperly admitted into evidence, upon the basis that 
there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, 
that the warrant was over broad on its face and as applied, 
based upon stale information and pretextural in nature of its 
execution. Therefore, this Court should reverse the admission 
of that evidence and remand the matter for a new trial. 
Further, the conviction of the defendant for a felony 
constitutes a denial of his constitutional rights to due 
process of law, in that the exacerbation of the statute from a 
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misdemeanor to a felony is arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. Therefore, in reversing and remanding, this 
Court should direct that in absence of further nexus between 
the school and the possession, a felony conviction cannot be 
obtained. 
DATED this dayof , 1989 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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